We use a regime switching approach to model the implementation of the SNB monetary policy. 
Introduction
Central banks rely on different mechanisms to implement their monetary policy.
The recent market turmoil highlighted how varying tools can entail completely different outcomes, in particular in terms of short term interest rate patterns.
During the recent financial market crisis, the ability of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) in stabilising its target rate was observed with much interest by many specialists. For instance, by means of its Survey magazine 1 , the International
Monetary Fund pointed out that "(T)he Swiss (monetary) approach imparts a degree of flexibility, which has served it well during the turbulence in financial markets." Probably the most noticeable characteristic of the SNB's monetary concept is the sense of balance between its long term objective of price stability and its implementation mechanism that is distinguished by a pragmatic short term flexibility. The intellectual background of this combination is discussed in Baltensperger, Hildebrand and Jordan (2007) . The former property, i.e. a firm long term anchor for nominal stability, has assured stable prices, which is an important prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the economy. The latter quality, i.e. short term flexibility in policy implementation, has two aspects.
First, it assures the regular functioning of liquidity provision in normal times
and a swift response to exogenous shocks to the financial market. Second, it is an effective tool to achieve the intended policy stance in turbulent times.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we propose an econometric representation that captures the main characteristics of the SNB implementation mechanism. An antecedent in the literature is Jordan and Kugler (2004) .
Our model differs from it in several respects. On the one hand, it takes account of the official operational target, which is a range for the three-month Swiss franc Libor. On the other hand, it incorporates the crucial role of SNB repo transactions, which provide the banking system with liquidity. A distinguishing characteristic of this dual mechanism in the monetary policy implementation is its adaptability in stress periods. We capture this feature in a regime switching model, where the regime mechanism depends on the tightness of money market conditions. Conceptually, the state dependency of the model ties with 3 scheduled decisions about the SNB target range were associated with significant effects on the 3M-Libor.
The structure of the remaining part of the paper is as follows: In Section 2
we review the main characteristics of the SNB monetary concept and its repo operations, and in Section 3 we explain the empirical set up. Section 4 contains the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
The monetary policy concept and its repo operations
In this section, we shortly review the main characteristics of the SNB's monetary policy concept and the Swiss franc repo market. More comprehensive contributions on the concept can be found in Peytrignet (2001, 2007) and Meyer (2000) . Veyrassat (2001 Veyrassat ( , 2004 and Kraenzlin (2007) 
The monetary policy concept
At the end of 1999, the SNB abandoned the monetary targeting approach. The new monetary policy framework is characterised by three main elements: (1) an explicit definition of price stability; (2) a conditional inflation forecast as main indicator for future policy decisions; (3) a range for the 3M-Libor as operational target. The overriding objective of price stability is considered to be achieved with an inflation rate, measured by the national consumer price index, of less than 2% per annum. An inflation forecast for the next 12 quarters which takes into account all relevant information is the main indicator for policy decisions.
The first two elements are complemented by the announcement of a target range for the three-month Swiss franc Libor. As documented in SNB (1999), the main reasons for choosing an off-shore market rate are the following: the Libor is the common money market rate, it is sensitive to all shocks relevant for monetary policy, and, by its very nature, it differs from repo rates, i.e. unlike a repo operation the Libor represents the indicative rate of "unsecured" interbank loans, which can give rise to liquidity and credit premia.
To understand the relevance of the last point, it is worth emphasizing the different implications of targeting "secure" and "unsecure" interest rates. The 
Repo market
A repo transaction is a loan secured by collateral. The cash taker sells securities to the cash provider and repurchases them after an agreed period. The cash taker pays the cash provider a repo rate depending on the maturity of the transaction. The Swiss franc repo market can be divided in two main parts, namely the SNB repo market, characterised by transactions between the SNB and banks, and the repo interbanking market.
The SNB provides the banks with liquidity via repo transactions on a daily basis. Repos are auctioned in the morning in a fixed tender (as a rule) or are concluded in the course of the day on a bilateral basis. The liquidity provided is credited to non-interest-bearing sight deposits which the banks keep with the SNB. In normal times, the demand for sight deposits is determined by payment transactions, by the need for precautionary balance, and by the minimum reserve requirements stipulated in the National Bank Act. 2 According to these provisions, the banks must cover certain short term liabilities with coins and banknotes denominated in Swiss francs as well as sight deposits held with the SNB. The liquidity provided by the SNB is then traded on the interbank market.
Interest rates on the money market are thus influenced by the price and volume of the liquidity injected by the SNB. In other words, the SNB indirectly steers the Libor by fixing rates and the amount to be allotted in the repo transactions.
New measures during the financial crisis in 2007-8
The SNB, as other central banks, has faced the crisis with three main measures:
unscheduled monetary decisions, repo transactions in US dollar and a swap arrangement through which the ECB can access Swiss franc liquidity to provide the Swiss franc funding allotted to banks in its jurisdiction.
Monetary policy assessments
After 
US dollar funding
This new facility was designed to facilitate the US dollar funding of SNB coun- 
Swiss franc funding
Foreign banks in the euro area with no direct access to SNB operations exerted an upward pressure on short term Swiss Franc money market rates. On 15 Oc- by using the nearest-to-maturity futures contracts on the Swiss franc threemonth Libor. In order to enhance the measurement precision and to minimise endogeneity problems, we measure the price change over 30 minutes, i.e. 10 minutes before and 20 minutes after the exact release time of a monetary policy decision. 3 We call this variable surpr t . The repo operations are represented by the one-week repo rate on day t, repo t (its difference is denoted ∆repo t ) and the allotted volume in the morning auctions. We compute the first difference of the allotment ratio (i.e. allotted divided by bid volume) and call it ∆allotratio t . 4 The intraday data set necessary to compute the monetary policy surprise and 3 For further information about the timing and surprise effect of SNB monetary policy assessments, cf. Ranaldo and Rossi (2007) . 4 In the morning auction, the SNB adds up all bids and decides the proportion to be allotted. Normally, it allots on a pro rata basis, i.e. after a minimal allotment to each bank, the remaining demand is accommodated in percentage of the amount bid. 7 the data on the repo operations are from the SNB. 5 The Libor evolves according to credit conditions in the money market. However, the flexibility of the SNB concept enables it to react to unexpected events.
To take account of these features, our empirical model allows the Libor to behave according to regimes characterised by normal and distressed markets. Empirically, the regime depends on the tightness of money market conditions, which is proxied by the standardised (to have zero mean and unit variance) spread between the Libor and repo rates, denoted z t . This spread can be seen as a broad measure of risk premia on interbank lending. In troubled times, this spread typically widens.
Other factors can determine the evolution of the Libor. It can follow an autoregressive pattern. Also, there can be some exogenous variables that correspond to those market factors that the SNB may take into account to fix its morning repo rates but that are outside its control. Below, we limit the empirical analysis to the VIX index, i.e. vix t . 6 The remaining variables capture the new funding facilities introduced by the SNB in the wake of the financial crisis. We use information publicly available to set up a dataset containing the announcement and implementation days of the US dollar and Swiss franc funding auctions. We keep these two facilities and their announcements as well as their execution times separate in order to distinguish their effects. The dummy variable, called swap t , equals 1 when a CHF funding auction takes place and 0 otherwise.
Econometric model
Our regime switching technique models the coefficients as changing smoothly with the regime that we generally call z. In practice, this means that the coefficient of a regressor is
where
When z (the standardised Libor-Repo spread) is low, then the effective slope is b 1 , when z = c, then the slope is (b 1 +b 2 )/2, and with a very high z the slope is effectively
This function is illustrated in Figure 2 (using the value of c estimated below). 5 We are grateful to Marcel Zimmermann for providing us the dataset. 6 All other variables we considered, such as the overnight volatility on the exchange rate market, were insignificant.
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The formation process of the Libor can be structured as follows:
This equation means that changes in the Libor can be due to five main drivers. First, it can be affected by unexpected changes in the official target range, i.e. surpr t . We carefully considered the timing of the news releases.
When the SNB announces its decision on the target range for the Libor before (after) the Libor rate fixing, i.e. at noon CET, the decision is supposed to impact on the Libor rate on the same day (day after). Second, the Libor might respond to changes in repo rates, i.e. ∆repo t . Since the SNB morning auction is set at 9:10 CET, we consider the effects of the repo operations on the same day of the Libor fixing. The coefficients on these two variables are allowed to change with the regime variable (the standardised Libor-Repo spread, lagged one day) as illustrated in equation (1).
Third, a broader provision of liquidity should decrease the Libor. We attempt to capture this effect by looking at the change in volume allotted at the morning repo auctions, i.e. ∆allotratio t . Fourth, we analyse whether the new funding facilities had some bearing on the Libor rates. In the equation above,
we take the representative case of the implementation of the Swiss franc funding provided by the Eurosystem, i.e. swap t . However, we also inspected the implementation and announcement effects of the US dollar funding. Fifth and finally, the VIX index, i.e. vix t−1 , is a proxy for exogenous variables. These three last variables in equation (2) are not allowed to change with the regime-as preliminary regressions indicated that the coefficients related to ∆allotratio t and vix t−1 do not change significantly across regimes and that Swiss franc funding auctions took place only in the high regime (e.g. swap t ).
We estimate the parameters by GMM (actually, nonlinear least squares) and the t-stats account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations. In total, there are 10 parameters (c in (1), and φ, δ 1 , δ 2 , χ 1 , χ 2 , ϕ, ψ, λ, α in (2)).
Limitations
It is worth emphasizing some limitations of the model presented above. 7 In particular, the repo conditions have changed over time. In mid-August 2007 (i.e.
at the beginning of the credit crunch) the SNB expanded its list of collateral eligible in the repo transactions. 8 On 16 October 2008, the SNB introduced a special purpose vehicle (SPV) as a long term financing to sustain the Swiss financial sector. Specifically, SNB created a SPV to perform an orderly liquidation of illiquid securities and other troubled assets held by the UBS. We controlled whether there was a particular response of the Libor on the announcement day of the SPV. This simple, ad hoc event study analysis rejected this hypothesis.
A final possible shortcoming of our study comes from the inception of the SNB Bills, an instrument to absorb liquidity, on 15 October 2008. Again, a simple event study analysis shows no particular effect on the announcement day.
We considered several alternative specifications of the model. In particular,
we analysed a bivariate VAR model in a regime switching setting where the first equation features the Libor dynamics and the second equation the repo rates. We also analysed treating the regime mechanism as dependent on the spread between the Libor and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates rather than between the Libor and repo rates. These alternative models deliver the same picture as the results presented below. We also considered an error correction mechanism between the Libor and repo rates, the actual changes of the midpoint target range in addition to the monetary surprise as well as one or more lags for the regressors and auto-regressive terms. They turned out to be insignificant. It is also worth noting that our results are not sensitive to the specific parameter 3 in the logistic function. We obtain similar results when it is replaced with any figure from one up to large positive numbers.
Empirical Findings
The empirical analysis is based on daily data from January 2000 to the end of 2008. Figure 1 shows the behaviour of the regime variable z (the standardised Libor-repo spread) across time. The high regime arises especially at the end of the sample period after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Figure 2 depicts the pattern of the regime function. It shows that the high regime kicks in when the standardised Libor-repo spread is above the estimated value at 1.3. normal (distressed) times, which we refer to as the "low regime" ("high regime").
Similarly, Table 2 shows the changes in the estimated coefficients between the two regimes. Low-regime (high-regime) days occurred 2084 (263) times.
Two main results emerge from our analysis. First, the Libor reacts very differently to repo and target range changes in the two regimes. In normal times (low regime), the repo rate appears to be the main driver. The Libor- when volatility is high 10 , which may require a counterbalancing interest rate move in order to preserve the price stability in the medium term.
Conclusion
We use a regime switching approach to model the implementation of the SNB's monetary policy. A regime switching technique is crucial to assess the flexibility inherent in its monetary policy concept. The empirical findings support the idea that the repo operations are instrumental in smoothing the monetary policy 9 One could raise the question whether monetary policy surprises are more effective in turbulent times since there are more. Our specification should be seen as free of this problem since we control for the regime. 10 See the safe haven effects of the Swiss franc analysed by Ranaldo and Söderlind (2007) 11 stance in normal times whereas (unexpected) decisions on the official operational target accompanied by a larger liquidity provision in the repo operations produce the aimed effects during distressed periods. Also, there is empirical evidence that the new facility designed to ease funding problems in the Swiss franc money market had the intended effects. 
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